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CHAPTER 6 
Commercial Law 
ALFRED I. MALESON 
§6.1. Consumer protection: Unfair Sales Act. The Unfair Sales 
Act, a part of the Massachusetts General Laws since 1938, prohibits 
retail advertisements or sales of individual items at less than cost if 
the purpose is to injure competitors or destroy competition. 1 Pro-
vision is made, however, for exemption from this prohibition if any 
of a number of exceptional circumstances should exist. Among these 
is the permission to cut the price below cost "in good faith to meet 
competition."2 The legislature has this SURVEY year made it clear that 
this exception permits price cutting only to meet lawful competition.3 
Price cutting to below cost in order to meet the price set by a com-
petitor's unlawful "loss leader" is not permissible. 
The constitutionality of this type of restriction has already been 
considered by the United States Supreme Court. In upholding a 
similar statute of Oklahoma, the Court refused to permit a chain store 
to cut prices below cost to meet unlawful competition, saying: "There 
is no constitutional right to employ retaliation against action outlawed 
by a State. . . . [The defendant] had no constitutional right to em-
bark on the very kind of destructive price war the Act was designed 
to prevent."4 
In the event tha.t a merchant should discover that a competitor has 
cut his price to a figure below his cost, the proper procedure is not a 
price war but an injunction. The Massachusetts courts have indeed 
already demonstrated their willingness to grant such injunctive re-
lief,5 and the complaining merchant may have the assistance of a 
district attorney in his efforts.6 
§6.2. Consumer protection: Cancellation by buyer. The defendant 
in Security Safety Corp. v. Kuznicki1 had contracted with the plaintiff 
for the installation of a fire detection system, agreeing in the written 
contract to liquidated damages of 33Ya per cent of the contract price 
ALFRED I. MALESON is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§6.1. 1 G.L., c. 93. §§14E-14K. 
2Id. §14G(h). 
3 Acts of 1966. c. 232. amending G.L., c. 93, §14G(h). 
4 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Association, 360 U.S. 334, 336-
337. 79 Sup. Ct. II 96, II99. 3 L. Ed. 2d 1280, 1283 (1959). 
Ii See Fournier v. TroianelIo, 332 Mass. 636, 127 N.E.2d 167 (1955). 
6 G.L., c. 93, §14H. 
§6.2. 1350 Mass. 157. 213 N.E.2d 866 (1966). 
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in the event of cancellation. The defendant then cancelled the contract 
on the morning after he had signed it, before the plaintiff had had any 
opportunity to begin performance. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
that, as there had been no opportunity for the plaintiff to incur much 
expense, the liquidated damages were unreasonable and would not be 
awarded. As there was no evidence of actual damages, damages were 
assessed at $1.00. 
Since this case did not involve a "sale of goods," but rather a con-
tract for work and labor, the Uniform Commercial Code was not 
involved. Had the Code been apposite, the Court would have found 
ample support for its position, since the Code provides: "A term fixing 
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty."2 Yet, 
whether the amount of 33Ya per cent is so unreasonably large would 
seem to be a question that could have been decided rather easily if 
the plaintiff had introduced any evidence, despite the lack of oppor-
tunity to incur expenses. 
The measure of a seller's damages could have been the profit which 
the seller would have made from full performances plus the commis-
sions for which it became obligated to its salesman.4 Such profits and 
commissions are generally believed to be substantial in this type of 
transaction. The lesson to be learned is not that a seller cannot get 
damages if a contract is cancelled quickly, but rather that he must 
introduce evidence of his expected profits. He may not rely on a 
liquidated damage clause. 
If a social policy protecting unwary consumers requires a greater 
freedom for consumers to cancel orders promptly without liability for 
damages, such a policy needs legislative - not judicial- promulga-
tion. The newly enacted Retail Installment Sales Act5 does give lip-
service to such a policy, by providing as follows: 
A. A buyer shall have the right to cancel ... for other than the 
seller's breach: ... 
(2) When, there not having been receipt or tender of a sub-
stantial part of the goods, services, or goods and services 
which the seller is required to furnish under a retail install-
ment sale agreement, signed by the seller, which has been 
consummated by a party thereto at a place other than the 
address of the seller, which may be his main office or branch 
thereof, the buyer, not later than five o'clock postmeridian 
on the next business day, notifies the seller that he is can-
celling, and such cancellation shall be effective thereupon. 
B. Notice of cancellation under this section shall be given to 
the seller at the place of business of the seller as set forth in 
2 G.L., c. 106, §2-718(1). 
8Id. §2-708(2). 
4Id. §2-710. 
II Acts of 1966, c. 284. This extremely important legislation is discussed in detail 
. in Chapter 7 of this SURVEY. 
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the agreement by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
which shall be posted not later than five o'clock post-
meridian on the next business day following execution of 
the agreement.6 
The fulsome language of this meretricious section is quoted extensively 
so that the enormity of its form of expression as well as of its devious 
purpose may be realized. Happily, it is not representative of the gen-
eral style of expression or purpose of the balance of the act. 
§6.3. Consumer protection: Small loans. The distinction between 
the service charge added to a time payment sale, which is not regulated, 
and interest on the loan of money, which is, requires a rather unsatisfy-
ing analysis of situations which combine elements of sales and loans. 
During the 1965 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court had held 
that the general financing of sales by the issuer of a credit card was 
not equivalent to engaging in the business of making loans.1 This 
1966 SURVEY year, the definition of a time sale was stretched even 
thinner in order to exempt a finance company from the licensing re-
quirement of the Small Loan Act.2 
Commonwealth v. Security Acceptance Corp.s involved a dealer and 
a finance company in a transaction which started as a pure sale, but 
which acquired serious loan overtones. In order to induce a buyer to 
purchase composition siding for $1900, the dealer agreed to advance 
$700 to the buyer to enable the buyer to liquidate other indebtedness. 
The dealer then took a single installment note for the total and sub-
sequently sold this note to the finance company. The interest rate, as 
found by the Court, was 14.5 per cent. The Small Loans Act, however, 
requires licensing of persons engaged in the business of making loans 
of under $3000 at rates above 12 per cent. 
The Court held that this transaction did not violate the statute, since 
the advance of money became an integral part of the transaction of 
sale. It relied upon several prior cases which had held that an advance 
could be made by an unlicensed lender even though it was below the 
minimum, if it brought the total indebtedness to the lender to above 
the minimum when added to an existing debt.4 While this analogy 
is far from perfect, it does provide some element of precedence to 
support a result which looks a little unusual. It is to be hoped that 
this result will be sharply limited to cases in which the advance is 
incidental and closely related to the sale, and that it will not be fol-
lowed if the sale can be found to be incidental to the loan. 
The newly enacted Retail Installment Sales Act would require 
6Id. §14. See §7.18 infra. 
§6.3. 1 Uni-Serv Corp. of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Banks, 349 Mass. 
277, 207 N.E.2d 887 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.1. 
2 G.L., c. 140, §96. 
s 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 123, 214 N.E.2d 47, also noted in §3.7 supra. 
4 Skinner v. Kapp1es, 320 Mass. 269, 60 N.E.2d 1 (1946); Skinner v. Cederberg, 
317 Mass. 773, 60 N.E.2d 92 (1945). 
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licensing of the finance company engaged in financing transactions 
such as this without regard to whether a cash advance is made.5 This 
act, however, does not require licensing of the seller himself, although 
it would require disclosure of the "annual finance charge." It is in-
teresting to note that while the Court in the principal case stated that 
the interest rate was 14.5 per cent the annual finance charge com-
puted under the formula required to be used by the Retail Installment 
Sales Act is 16.8 per cent. 
§6.4. Consumer protection: Mortgage prepayment. Mortgage notes 
secured by first mortgages on dwellings containing not over three 
households and occupied at least in part by the mortgagor may have 
clauses requiring penalties on prepayment only as permitted by statute. 
In the past, such penalties could be the greater of three months in-
terest or, if prepayment occurred during the first year, the balance of 
the interest for the first year.1 This has now been changed so that such 
penalties may not be more than the lesser of the balance of the interest 
for the first year or interest for three months.2 This change effectively 
prohibits penalties for prepayments beyond the first year. An excep-
tion is made, however, for prepayments made to refinance the mortgage 
at another financial institution. In such a case, a penalty of three 
month's interest is permitted if the prepayment occurs within three 
years. 
Since interest rates currently are at a level higher than they have 
been for many years, this new legislation may prove to be quite bene-
ficial to people who for the first time are getting mortgages today, 
if the rates should decline after three years. For those who prepay 
because of a sale of their dwelling, the advantage to a borrower of the 
new legislation is obvious, whatever may be the market for money. 
§6.5. Sales: Warranty of title. Two cases arising this 1966 SURVEY 
year involved warranty of title. The first was concerned with the extent 
of liability of an auctioneer when admittedly the title received by the 
buyer was defective. The second raised the question of how the buyer 
proves that title is defective in order to hold the seller liable, when 
the buyer himself has settled with the claimant of paramount title. 
The plaintiff in the first case, Stan Cross Buick, Inc. v. Concord 
Auto Auction, Inc.,! had purchased an automobile at an auction con-
ducted by the defendant auctioneer. He received with the automobile 
a document captioned "Title Warranty and Bill of Sale." This docu-
ment was signed by the seller (a dealer in Maine) as seller and also by 
the defendant auctioneer as "guarantor" of buyer's title. The buyer 
was subsequently held liable for the value of the vehicle in an action 
for conversion brought by the claimant of paramount title to the 
5 G.L., c. 255D, §2, added by Acts of 1966, c. 284. See §7.19 infra. 
§6.4. 1 G.L., c. 183, §56. 
2 Id., as amended by Acts of 1966, c. 664. 
§6.5. 1350 Mass. 14, 212 N.E.2d 862 (1965). 
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vehicle. In the present action, he seeks to recover from the auctioneer 
for breach of warranty of title. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the guaranty of title of the 
auctioneer was a warranty running directly to the buyer, upon which 
the buyer could recover without first attempting to recover from the 
seller. Since the circumstances of the sale were such as to give the 
buyer ample reason to know that the auctioneer did not claim title 
in himself, no warranty of title by the auctioneer arose either under 
the Uniform Sales Act, which was in force when the transaction oc-
curred, or under the Uniform Commercial Code.2 His liability was 
rather like that of a manufacturer who makes an express warranty 
which is, in effect, an offer that may be accepted when the buyer pur-
chases the goods from a seller other than the manufacturer. Since such 
a warranty is not created by the statute governing sales, but is simply 
a collateral contract, a court must construe it as such. In the present 
case, the Supreme Judicial Court found that the intent of the agree-
ment was that the auctioneer guarantee title rather than that he 
merely guarantee payment by the seller if the seller's liability were first 
established. 
The second case involved the problem of vouching-in. Liability of a 
seller to a buyer for breach of warranty, whether the warranty is of 
quality or of title, may depend upon a determination of liability vel 
non of the buyer to a third party. The fact that the buyer has been 
found to be liable to a third party, however, may not be determinative 
of his rights against the seller, as was learned by the defendant buyer 
in Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Neilsen.s 
The plaintiff in that case had sold a florist's cooler to the defendant 
after having repossessed it from a previous buyer by virtue of an un-
recorded security agreement. The previous buyer subsequently was 
adjudged bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy then claimed the 
cooler, apparently contending that the unrecorded security agreement 
was ineffective against him. After a notice to the plaintiff-seller of a 
petition to sell this cooler free of the security interest of the plaintiff, 
the trustee sold the cooler free of the interest to the defendant. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held in a rescript opinion that the buyer 
could not show a breach of warranty of title from these facts. Despite 
the notice to the seller of the proceedings in the bankruptcy court, 
there had been no effective notice to require him to come in and 
defend. 
The Uniform Commercial Code provides explicitly for the substance 
and effect of a notice vouching in a seller when the seller may be re-
quired to indemnify a buyer who has himself been sued.4 The notice 
must be written; and for the seller to be bound by any determination 
in the case against the buyer, the notice must state that the seller may 
2 G.L., c. 106, §2-312(2). 
3 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1520, 213 N.E.2d 389. 
"G.L., c. 106, §2·607(5). 
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come in and defend and that if he does not do so he will be bound by 
any common determination of fact. Failure to give such explicit notice 
should not bar the buyer from attempting to prove the breach of war-
ranty independently, but the mere fact of the first determination will 
not be proof of such breach, as was held in the principal case. 
§6.6. Commercial paper: Enforcement by one of two payees. 
Instruments payable to the order of two or more payees in the alter-
native are enforceable by anyone of them. If not payable in the alter-
native, however, it may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only 
by all of them. The comments to the Uniform Commercial Code sec-
tion which states this rule explain the effect of the rule by saying, 
"Likewise, both must join in any action to enforce the instrument."l 
In Marlboro Supply, Inc. v. Webb Supply CO.,2 the Supreme Judicial 
Court was called upon to determine what remedy, if any, might be 
available to one of two payees if he wants to enforce the instrument by 
suit and if the other payee does not want to join in the action. 
The payee who wanted to enforce the note brought a bill in equity 
asking either that the other payee be compelled to join in the suit or 
that there be a partition. The Court decided that the case was within 
its equity jurisdiction by virtue of General Laws, Chapter 214, Section 
3, which provides for jurisdiction over "(3) Other cases in which three 
or more parties have distinct rights or interests which cannot be justly 
and definitely decided and adjudicated in an action at law." The Court 
then held that the proper remedy was to order the reluctant payee to 
join in the suit. 
Negotiable paper includes instruments payable in the first instance 
to the order of payees "together or in the alternative."3 Divisive in-
terests are not recognized, so that instruments payable to two persons, 
for example, may not be payable half to each. Partial assignments 
(though not partial negotiations) of existing instruments, however, are 
recognized.4 Therefore, partition also might have been a permissible 
remedy. However, in view of the fact that the notes in question were 
secured by mortgages which were to be foreclosed, the choice of remedy 
made by the Court would certainly seem to be the proper one under 
the circumstances of this case. 
§6.7. Commercial paper: Impairment of recourse. The Uniform 
Commercial Code abolished distinctions between discharge of classes 
of parties to instruments and discharge of the whole instrument, sub-
stituting instead a logical set of rules to deal with the interrelationship 
of the various parties. Thus, if the holder of an instrument discharges 
any party, the result is .that all parties who had a right of recourse to 
§6.6. 1 C.L., c. 106, §3-116. This section does not use the terms "joint" or 
"several." The purpose of eliminating these familiar terms was to remove the 
possibility of contentions of survivorship. 
2350 Mass. 43, 213 N.E.2d 248 (1965), 
3 C.L., c. 106, §3-110. 
4Id. §3-202. 
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the party discharged are automatically discharged.! If the holder re-
serves his rights against these other parties, however, they are not 
discharged. Such a reservation of rights, though, preserves not only 
the holder's rights against these other parties, but also the rights of 
these parties against the party whom the holder purported to dis-
charge in the first place. 
The plaintiff in Priggen Steel Buildings Co. v. Parsons2 was the 
payee of a note that had been endorsed by the defendants for the ac-
commodation of the maker. After the maker defaulted in payment of 
this note, he executed an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Al-
though the payee assented to this assignment and subsequently received 
as a final dividend from the assignee a portion of the amount of the 
note, he expressly reserved his rights against the accommodation en-
dorsers. The Supreme Judicial Court applied the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and gave effect to the reservation by deciding that the 
endorsers were still liable. 
Although the case did not involve the rights of recourse which the 
endorsers might now have against the maker, such recourse by an 
accommodation party who pays is provided for expressly.s This re-
course should have been preserved despite the assent by the holder of 
the note to the assignment for the benefit of creditors, since a pur-
ported discharge by a holder who reserves his own rights against such 
endorsers, as explained above, is only partially effective as a discharge 
of the maker. 
§6.8. Commercial paper: Proof of discharge. The discharge of a 
party to a negotiable instrument may take place by a variety of means 
besides payment. The decision in Sherman v. Koufman,! however, 
reached conclusions which at times might make it difficult for the 
maker of a note to prove that a discharge did occur. The testimony of 
the defendant (the maker of several notes) was to the effect that the 
proceeds of the notes were in fact an advance toward payment for 
expected services in connection with the sale of certain real property. 
These services were later performed, and, the defendant testified, the 
payee told the defendant that she would not enforce the notes. (These 
notes plus an additional sum received by the defendant in cash 
amounted approximately to the agreed compensation.) At the time of 
the closing, the defendant signed a broad release from all claims on 
account of the real estate in question. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that by this release the defendant 
gave up his right to a return of the notes for cancellation. The Court 
added: "We find no evidential basis for a defense of accord and satis-
faction or payment." It then determined that the defendant was still 
liable on the notes, affirming the decree which was based on a verdict 
directed for the plaintiff, the representative of the now deceased payee. 
§6.7. 1 G.L., c. 106, §§3·601(3)(b), 3·606. 
2350 Mass. 62, 213 N.E.2d 252 (1966). 
S G.L., c. 106, §3·415(5). 
§6.8. 1349 Mass. 606, 211 N.E.2d 220 (1965). 
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This result is very unsatisfying, although from the report of the 
conflicting evidence in the case, it can hardly be determined whether 
justice was actually served. The defendant's pleadings were so full of 
objections that were completely without merit, such as that the notes 
were not negotiable, or that there was a lack or failure of considera-
tion, that the actual claim must have become obscured. 
Methods of discharging negotiable instruments are set out in Sec-
tion 3-601 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Of all the methods, the 
only one which requires delivery of the instrument to the person dis-
charged is renunciation.2 Renunciation requires no consideration, but 
it must be shown by a signed and delivered writing or by a surrender 
of the instrument. It is thus only partially like a "release," since a re-
lease may be supported by consideration. If a release is supported by 
consideration, then, as stated by Corbin: "The problem is not one of 
delivery, but one of bargaining agreement or of a communicated 
expression actually inducing action in reliance."3 
Among the other methods prescribed by the Code to discharge a 
party is "any other act or agreement with such party which would dis-
charge his simple contract for the payment of money."4 An "accord 
and satisfaction," as to which the Court found no evidence, is not a 
separate method but comes within this broader provision. Surely if 
the defendant's version of the facts were believed, it would seem that 
payment for services rendered by giving up a contractual debt would 
be sufficient to discharge such a simple contract. A note, the maker of 
which is discharged in this manner, does not need to be returned in 
order for the discharge to be effective vis a vis the payee. Thus, it 
would seem that the Court may have placed too much importance on 
the release which it determined gave up any rights of the defendant 
to a return of the instruments. The case is somewhat unfortunate for 
if the defendant's obligation has been satisfied he should not be re-
quired to pay again. If his obligation has not been satisfied, the issue 
should not be clouded by the release which he signed. 
§6.9. Banks and banking: Organization and officers. Branch bank-
ing generally is not permitted without specific statutory authority. This 
year, the legislature extended the power of the Commissioner of 
Banks to authorize branches to include "mobile branch banking," 
within the county where the main office of the bank is located.1 Re-
portedly, there are now two such mobile branches operating in the 
western portion of the state, filling geographical voids in areas which 
could not support permanent bank buildings. These "bankmobiles" 
operate at specified places on specified days and hours, under regula-
tions of the Commissioner designed to provide adequate security. 
2 G.L.. c. 106. §3-605. This is the only section mentioned in the decision. The 
all-important §3-601 seems to have been lost in the shuffle. 
3 Corbin. Contracts §1238 (one vol. ed. 1952). 
4 G.L., c. 106, §3-601(2). 
§6.9. 1 Acts of 1966. c. 245, adding G.L., c. 167, §60. 
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If the Board of Bank Incorporation refuses to certify that the forma-
tion of a proposed trust company will promote the public convenience 
and advantage, the applicant may renew his application without con-
sent of the Board after one year has elapsed. Further proceedings may 
now be taken even during that year, if the Board approves. Petitions 
for the establishment of branch offices of trust companies, if denied, 
may now also be renewed before the lapse of a year if the Board ap-
proves.2 
Trustees or officers of savings banks have long been prohibited from 
serving two savings banks, and more recently from serving co-operative 
banks or savings and loan associations. They are now prohibited as 
well from serving trust companies or national banking associations.3 
A grandfather clause for those serving before the effective date (April 
4, 1966) is provided. 
Trustees of savings banks must be citizens of Massachusetts, de-
positors of the corporation, and under 72 years of age. In the past, 
these qualifications were waived for any trustee who was also president 
of the bank. This exception has now been removed, so that every 
trustee must now meet these qualifications.4 
Officers of trust companies used to be flatly prohibited from borrow-
ing from their corporations. They may now borrow up to $5000 in 
general, and up to $30,000 on a loan secured by mortgage on their 
own single family dwellings, provided that the interest and other terms 
give them no preference and that a majority of the entire board of 
directors approve.5 
§6.10. Banks and banking: Loans and investments. Ad hoc 
changes in permissible loans and investments continue to be made on 
a large scale. These are summarized briefly in this section. 
Individual personal loans permitted to be made by co-operative 
banks have been increased from $1500 to $2500, and the aggregate 
loans of this type from 2 to 10 per cent of deposits.1 
Individual personal loans permitted to be made by savings banks 
have been increased from $1500 to $3500, and the aggregate loans of 
this type from 5 to 10 per cent of deposits up to $50,000, and 5 per cent 
of deposits over $50,000.2 
The maximum permissible amount of individual loans made by 
credit unions for notes secured by responsible endorsers is $1000 or 
$1500, depending upon the size of the credit union. These limits have 
been increased to $1500 and $2000 if the credit union is a member of 
the Massachusetts Credit Union Share Insurance Corporation.3 
The aggregate amount of loans by co-operative banks secured by 
2 Acts of 1966, c. 200, amending G.L., c. 172, §§7, 11. 
3 Acts of 1966, c. 852, amending G.L., c. 168, §lO(3). 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 225, amending G.L., c. 168, §10. 
5 Acts of 1966, c. 186, amending G.L., c. 172, §18. 
§6.10. 1 Acts of 1965, c. 814, amending G.L., c. 170, §26(8). 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 8lO, amending G.L., c. 168, §37. 
3 Acts of 1965, c. 784, adding G.L., c. 171, §24, par. 3A. 
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mortgage on real estate and exceeding 80 per cent of the value of the 
mortgaged property has been increased from 10 per cent of deposits to 
20 per cent.4 
The limit of individual mortgage loans of not over 75 per cent of the 
value of the real estate that may be made by savings banks has been 
increased from $30,000 to $35,000. For loans of not over 80 per cent, 
the limit has been raised from $25,000 to $30,000, and for residential 
development loans for financing construction, from $20,000 to $30,000. 
In addition, permission to make such residential development loans 
and loans of 80 to 90 per cent of the value of the property has been 
extended from single family dwellings to four family units, if one unit 
is owner occupied.5 
Real estate loans made by trust companies which formerly could 
not exceed 75 per cent of the appraised value of the property and 
could not be outstanding for over 20 years may now be made for up 
to 80 per cent of the appraised value and be amortized over 25 years. 
In addition, construction loans for industrial or commercial building 
which formerly were not classed as real estate loans if for not over 18 
months will now be so treated if for not over 24 months.6 
To the extent that investments by co-operative banks may be made 
by making deposits in other banks, the statutes now permit invest-
ments in certificates of deposit.7 
Changes were made in several types of investments in various federal 
agencies that may be made by savings banks, by substituting a detailed 
list of federally established agencies and securities for the prior general 
provisions. In addition, details were given for investments in obliga-
tions of other banking corporations and in bank holding companies.s 
Savings banks, co-operative banks, and trust companies have been 
permitted since 1960 to participate with one another in loans secured 
by the Federal Housing Administration. They may now participate as 
well with National Banking Associations, Federal Savings and Loan 
Associations, and domestic life insurance companies.9 
§6.11. Banks and banking: Miscellaneous. The Commissioner of 
Banks must examine all banks at least annually, and may make or have 
made further examination at the expense of the banks. An amendment 
of the section authorizing this makes it clear that this may be by out-
side certified public accountants or public accountants, not otherwise 
employed by the bank, who are subject to the direction of the Com-
missioner. I 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 169, amending C.L., c. 170, §24(3A). 
II Acts of 1966, c. 218, amending C.L., c. 168, §§35(5), (6), (6A) , (7). 
6 Acts of 1966, c. 220, amending C.L., c. 172, §55(A)(4), (C). 
7 Acts of 1966, c. 167, amending C.L., c. 170, §§26, 40. 
S Acts of 1966, c. 295, adding C.L., c. 168, §42(6), and striking §§49(3), (4); Acts 
of 1966, c. 288, amending C.L., c. 168, §§47(3), 49; Acts of 1966, c. 227, amending 
C.L., c. 168, §47(3). 
9 Acts of 1965, c. 705, amending C.L., c. 167, §51. 
§6.11. I Acts of 1966, c. 296, amending C.L., c. 167, §2. 
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Reports of monthly meetings of the directors of trust companies are 
required by statute. This statute now requires these reports to be 
retained for six years. The change also permits modifications, in the 
discretion of the Commissioner, of the list of transactions required for 
the report.2 
While withdrawal of deposits from special notice accounts may de-
pend upon notice, withdrawal of dividends may not be so restricted 
if the depositor signs a permanent dividend order or demands the 
dividend within one year. The order must now be signed before the 
date on which the dividend is payable, or the demand must be made 
within one year of that date. Prior to this statutory change, the crucial 
date was that of declaration of the dividend.s 
Interest on loans against special notice accounts used to require an 
interest premium at a rate of not less than 2 per cent more than that 
paid on the account. A drastic statutory change now permits but does 
not require an interest premium, and limits the rate to not more than 
I per cent more than that paid.4 This severe limitation on the cost 
of making a "withdrawal" without notice, in the guise of a "loan 
against the account," should make the higher yield of special notice 
accounts especially attractive. 
2 Acts of 1966, c. 177, amending G.L., c. 172, §17. 
S Acts of 1966, c. 106, amending G.L., c. 168, §22(a)(I)(b). 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 206, amending G.L., c. 168, §40. 
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